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Abstract
The notion that damages should be multiplied by the reciprocal of the prob-
ability of punishment has been around since Bentham and is one of the basic
lessons of the law and economics literature. However, the simple 1/p multiplier
turns out be inapplicable in the civil damages setting. The multiplier that brings
about first-best deterrence must be chosen by striking a balance between the sup-
ply of lawsuits and the need to internalize costs. Moreover, given the costs of
litigation, a multiplier that minimizes overall social costs (in contrast to achiev-
ing first-best deterrence) may need to be set at a level that effectively bars many
claims. This paper derives optimal damage multipliers for a costly civil litigation
system and examines the conflicting implications of deterrence and social cost
minimization as objectives in the design of an optimal multiplier. An empirical
application suggests that the first-best deterrence multiplier for the tort system is
roughly equal to two.
1I. Introduction
The notion that damages should be multiplied to make up for uncertainty in
punishment has been around at least since Bentham.1  The traditional account of the
optimal multiplier is straightforward: if p is the probability of liability, then 1/p is the
multiplier that should be applied to the damage judgment.  If damages are multiplied by
1/p, then the injurer’s expected damage judgment will internalize the social loss due to
his conduct.
This simple notion of the optimal multiplier has been developed further in the law
enforcement context starting with Becker (1968), and later refinements.2  However, no
one has worked out the optimal damages multiplier for the private litigation context.
That is the goal of this paper.
To be precise, this paper has two goals.  First, it seeks to derive optimal damage
multipliers for a costly legal system.  Second, it aims to examine the conflicting
implications of deterrence and social cost minimization as objectives in the design of an
optimal multiplier.
The first goal, the specification of the optimal damage multiplier, is easy to justify
and presumably uncontroversial.  Several recent articles have approached the optimal
multiplier issue from various perspectives.  Polinsky and Shavell (1999), examining
punitive damages, argue that the optimal damages multiplier is simply the reciprocal of
the probability of liability.  Their analysis, consistent with Bentham, sees multiplying
damages by the reciprocal of the probability of liability as necessary to offset the dilution
in deterrence that results from uncertainty in the imposition of liability.  Easterbrook
(1985) argues that the uncertainty in detection provides the only good rationale for
multiplying antitrust damages.  Craswell (2000) shows that the effects of uncertain
liability on deterrence are complicated, diluting deterrence in some instances while
enhancing deterrence in others, and concludes that there is no general case for
multiplying damage awards by a factor greater than one.  Though coming from different
perspectives, these articles are consistent with the traditional approach that takes
uncertainty in enforcement as the key determinant of the optimal multiplier – i.e., the
“1/p approach” to the optimal multiplier.
However, there are drawbacks in the 1/p approach to the multiplier.  While it may
be useful in Becker’s law enforcement context to treat the probability of apprehension (a
component of the probability of punishment) as uniform and exogenous, this approach is
less useful in the litigation context.  The probability of litigation (a component of the
probability of liability) differs among classes of litigant (securities class actions,
malpractice) and probably within each class of litigant, depending on the relationship
between the expected award and the cost of litigation.3  An implementable approach to
                                                
1 Bentham (1781)
2 Polinsky and Shavell (1979).  For criticism of the multiplier policy from a behavioral perspective, see
Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman (2000).
3 Shavell (1982).
2optimal damage multipliers should be capable of specifying the functional relationship
between the probability of litigation, on one hand, and variables such as the expected
award and cost of litigation on the other.   Moreover, in view of this relationship the
multiplier should be set in a way that balances the supply of lawsuits with the need for
internalization.  For example, if initially only one out of ten injury victims sue, and
setting the multiplier at ten results in all victims suing, costs would be over-internalized –
because everyone would collect ten times damages.  In short, rather than treating the
probability of liability as exogenous, an optimal damages framework should treat it as
endogenous, a function of the factors that determine liability.4
In this paper, uncertainty in the imposition of liability is not exogenous.  It results
from the fact that litigation is costly.  We do not assume that the plaintiff has difficulty in
detecting the injurer.  Rather, some victims fail to sue in this model because litigation is
costly, an inescapable fact of the real world.  The term “litigation cost” should be
understood broadly to cover all costs that might deter some victims from filing suit.  This
includes the cost of paying for an attorney, and less obviously the opportunity cost of
time absorbed by litigation, the psychological stress of litigation, and the costs that result
because litigation tends to rupture certain relationships (e.g., employer and employee).
Although we assume detection is certain, the uncertain detection model can be
viewed as a special case of the model in this paper.  Uncertain detection is a special case
of the litigation cost model in which the victim must incur some cost in order to detect
the injurer.  The perspective adopted here is arguably more general.  Taking litigation
costs into account naturally generates uncertainty in litigation.  Second, in view of the
importance of litigation costs, any serious effort to specify optimal damage awards
should take them into account.
The second goal of this paper, to examine the conflicting implications of
deterrence and social cost minimization, is intended to provoke debate or at least to raise
questions.  We distinguish two types of optimal multiplier, an optimally deterring (or
optimal deterrence) multiplier and a socially optimal multiplier.  The optimally deterring
multiplier brings about first-best deterrence, given costly litigation.  In other words, if the
injurer’s failure to take care imposes a loss of $1200 on society, which is the sum of a
direct harm to the victim of $1000 and the victim’s expected litigation cost of $200, then
the optimally deterring multiplier induces the injurer to take care whenever his cost of
care is less than $1200.  Alternatively, one can say that the optimally deterring multiplier
treats the victim’s lawsuit as a natural byproduct of the injury and seeks to internalize to
the injurer the full social costs of his conduct.5 In contrast, the socially optimal multiplier
minimizes the sum of injuries, injury avoidance costs, and litigation costs.
We show that the optimally deterring multiplier is greater than the socially
optimal multiplier.  This implies that first best deterrence is never optimal under a
                                                
4 Using this information, a punishing authority could specify optimal multipliers for different classes of
litigant.
5 For an intuitive, ethical argument for treating the victim’s litigation cost as part of the injurer’s harm, see
Abel (1987)
3multiplier regime.  Moreover, we show that the optimally deterring and socially optimal
multiplier levels diverge as the cost of litigation increases.  The reason is simple.  As
litigation becomes more costly, the optimally deterring multiplier increases because it
forces the injurer to pay for the victim’s cost of litigating, which is also increasing.  In
contrast, the socially optimal multiplier declines because as litigation becomes more
expensive, it becomes less likely that the deterrence benefit provided by an additional
lawsuit will outweigh its cost.  Once the deterrent value of the marginal lawsuit dips
below its cost, the social planner will set the multiplier less than one and may continue to
push it down to zero in order to discourage additional lawsuits.
For simplicity, we focus on the case of strict liability – we consider negligence in
the appendix.  Since simple closed-form solutions for the two optimal multipliers are not
available, we ran simulations to compare the multipliers in terms of their responses to
changes in the ratio of damages to litigation costs.  The optimally deterring multiplier is
always greater than one and grows as the ratio of the cost of litigation to the harm
increases.  In contrast, the socially optimal multiplier can be less than one, and falls
toward zero as the ratio of the litigation cost to the harm increases.  The simulations
suggest that it is unlikely that a treble damages rule, the standard multiplier observed in
antitrust, could be socially optimal.6
Using data from two of the RAND Corporation’s studies of civil litigation, we
made rough estimates of the optimally deterring multiplier for the tort system overall,
auto torts, and medical malpractice.  The data suggest that the overall optimal deterrence
multiplier should be roughly two – a “double damages” rule.  The optimal deterrence
multiplier for auto torts, which account for half of total tort claims,7 is also roughly two.
The data do not suggest a strong case, on optimal deterrence grounds, for multiplying
medical malpractice damages.  Of course, our estimates should be taken as preliminary,
and largely as a suggestion for future research.
The normative question generated by this paper is whether society should prefer
the socially optimal multiplier to the optimally deterring multiplier.  While the socially
optimal multiplier maximizes social wealth, it does so, in some cases, by barring some
victims from bringing suit.  The socially optimal multiplier enhances social wealth when
the deterrent value of the lawsuits that are barred is less than their additional litigation
costs.  In simpler terms, the socially optimal damages regime allows injurers to harm
people without having to pay the entire cost of the harm when the losses suffered by
victims are too small to justify the expenses of a trial.  The optimally deterring multiplier
                                                
6 We are examining the standard accident model in which lapses of care raise the likelihood of injuries.  We
do not focus explicitly on intentional injuries, though one could argue that intentional injuries are simply
special cases of the model we examine.  Intentional harms present a more difficult issue in the case where
the injurer’s conduct is inefficient under all circumstances.  If the cost of care for every potential injurer is
always less than the expected harm to a victim, then an efficient rule would bar the injurer’s activity.
Although the internalizing penalty would be sufficient as a deterrent in this case, there is no economic
reason to prefer the internalizing penalty to an even greater penalty level (perhaps infinite).  See Becker
(1968).  For an application to the litigation context, see Hylton (1998).
7 1986 RAND study, executive summary, at x.
4does not allow this to occur: it sets the penalty at a level that internalizes the full social
costs of harmful conduct to injurers.
The socially optimal multiplier would be chosen by a social planner that seeks to
minimize social costs.  An alternative approach, the Aristotelian corrective justice
framework, would make the correction of wrongs the highest priority of the legal system.
The optimally deterring multiplier would be chosen under any plausible corrective justice
framework.
Part II presents a simple numerical illustration of the two types of multiplier and a
discussion of related literature.  Part III presents the model.  Part IV discusses extensions
of the model to the case of negligence.  Part V presents an empirical application, using
data from two RAND studies.  Part VI reviews the results and discusses implications for
the legal system.
II. The Conflict between Deterrence and Social Cost Minimization: An Example and
Some Related Literature
In this section we elaborate on the relationship between the optimally deterring
damage level and the socially optimal damage level, and we show the corresponding
damage multipliers.  As we noted earlier, the optimally deterring multiplier internalizes
the social costs of the injurer’s conduct, while the socially optimal multiplier minimizes
the sum of injuries, injury avoidance costs, and litigation costs.
To see the difference between the two, consider a simple example, based on
Shavell (1982b).  Suppose the injurer can choose to take care or not to take care.  If he
takes care, the probability of an injury is .25.  If he does not take care, the probability of
an injury is .75.  The loss to the victim is $100.  The cost of taking care is $20.  Taking
care is socially desirable because the total social cost when the injurer takes case is $20 +
(.25)($100) = $45, while the total social cost when the injurer does not take case is
(.75)($100) = $75.
Rather than comparing the total social cost when the injurer takes care to the total
social cost when he does not, an alternative is to compare the social benefit from care to
its cost (the Hand formula approach).  In this case, the social benefit from care is the
expected value of avoided harms, (.75 - .25)($100) = $50, while the cost of care is $20.
Since the social benefit from care exceeds the cost of care, care is socially desirable.
However, the injurer will not take care without the threat of a lawsuit.  This is
easy to see, because if the victim cannot sue to collect compensation for his injury, the
cost to the injurer of taking care is $20, and the cost to the injurer of not taking care is $0.
Since lawsuits deter careless conduct, we can say that the social benefit from deterrence,
or deterrence benefit, is the expected value of avoided harms net of the avoidance cost,
$50 - $20 = $30.  The cost of “deterrence” is simply the expected total cost of litigation.
5Suppose liability is strict and the cost of litigation is $61 for either party.  Since
$100 > $61, the victim will definitely sue if injured.  Given this, the real social cost of
failing to take care is (.75 - .25)($100 + $122) = $111.  The injurer’s marginal liability,
however, is (.75 - .25)($100 + $61) = $80.5.  In this case, the optimally deterring damage
multiplier, md*, equates md* ($80.5) = $111, and is therefore md* = 1.38.
But is ms* = 1.38 the socially optimal multiplier?  Consider the total social cost
when the victim does not sue, and when the victim does sue.  When the victim does not
or, for some reason, cannot sue, the total social cost is (.75)($100) = $75.  When the
victim does sue, the total social cost is (.25)($222) + $20  = $75.5.  Since society is better
off if the victim does not sue, the socially optimal multiplier should be such that
(ms*)($100) < $.61, implying that ms* < .61.  As long as this holds, no victim will sue, and
society will be better off than under the regime in which victims sue and injurers take
care.  As this numerical example shows, the optimally deterring and socially optimal
damage multipliers may not be the same.
Instead of comparing the total social cost when the litigation is permitted and
when it is not, consider comparing the deterrence benefit to the cost of deterrence
(litigation).  Recall that the deterrence benefit in this case is $30.  The expected total cost
of litigation is (.25)($122) = $30.5.  Since the deterrence benefit is less than the cost of
litigation, social costs are minimized by prohibiting lawsuits.
For comparison, consider the corresponding additive adjustments to the
compensatory damage level.  To internalize all of the victim’s harm, we would increase
the victim’s damage award by an amount equal to the victim’s cost of litigation, $61.
This is the additive adjustment that would correspond to the optimally deterring
multiplier of 1.38.  In contrast, the socially optimal additive adjustment removes the
victim’s incentive to sue.  Thus, the socially optimal additive adjustment in this case is to
subtract some amount greater than $39 from the victim’s award.
Now, let us link this example to the literature, in order to clarify this paper’s
contribution.  Shavell (1982b) showed that the private and social incentives to sue
diverge, and thus it may be optimal to bar suits in cases where there is a private incentive
to sue.  This is illustrated in our numerical example.
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) show that the optimal level of liability under strict
liability may be greater or less than the compensatory level, depending on the
productivity of care.  The productivity of care is determined by the extent to which care
reduces the expected level of damages.  If care is not sufficiently productive, they show,
the optimal level of liability may be less than the compensatory level.  The Polinsky and
Rubinfeld paper can be viewed as a generalization of Shavell (1982b).  The case in which
it is optimal to bar lawsuits happens to be the case in which the marginal deterrence
benefit is below the marginal cost of litigation (Hylton 2002).
Indeed, if care is productive in the sense that the marginal deterrence benefit
exceeds the marginal litigation cost at levels of liability below the optimum, the optimal
6damage level is equal to compensatory damages plus the victim’s cost of litigation
(Hylton, 2002).  If care is not productive in this sense, the optimal damage level will be
lower, and may be zero (prohibition of all lawsuits).  In our numerical example, care is
not productive because the deterrence benefit is $30, and the marginal litigation cost is
$30.5.  The socially optimal damage award is any level less than $61, which is obviously
less than the compensatory level.
Generalizing, the socially optimal and optimally deterring damage levels will be
the same when care is productive, in the sense just defined.  When care is not productive,
the socially optimal damage level will be less than the optimally deterring damage level.
These results clearly have implications for optimal damage multipliers, but they
do not translate easily – hence the need for the analysis that follows.  If care is
unproductive at all damages levels, then it follows from Shavell (1982b) that lawsuits
should be prohibited.  In this case the socially optimal damages multiplier is zero.
How should the multiplier be set when care is productive, in the sense that the
deterrence benefit is greater than or equal to the expected litigation cost?  One simple
approach is to use a multiplier equal to the sum of the compensatory award and the cost
of litigation divided by the compensatory award.  Thus, if the compensatory award is
$100, and the victim’s cost of litigation $20, the optimal award level could be achieved
by using a multiplier of 1.2.  The drawback to this solution is that the multiplier would be
individual-specific; that is, it would depend on every individual’s damage award.
We consider below uniform multipliers, which have the advantage of being useful
for comparison with statutorily-set multipliers, such as the treble damages rule of
antitrust.  We consider both the optimally deterring and socially optimal multipliers.
III. Model
All injurers and victims are risk neutral, and only injurers can take care to reduce
the risk of an accident.8  (Thus, the model is one of unilateral care.)  If an injurer takes
care, the probability of an accident is q, while if he does not take care, the probability is
p, where p>q>0.  Let x be the injurer’s cost of care, which will generally vary across
injurers.
The dollar loss to victims in the event of an accident is v, which is unaffected by
the injurer’s care choice but varies across victims.  Injurers do not know the value of a
particular victim’s v, but they know its distribution across the population of potential
victims, which is given by H(v).  Thus, the expected damage that a randomly chosen
victim will experience in the event of an accident is
∫∞=
0
)()( vvdHvE . (1)
                                                
8 The model is based on Hylton (1990a, 1990b).
7Both injurers and victims incur a cost if the victim of an accident files a suit for damages.
Let cv be the victim’s cost of filing suit, and let ic  be the injurer’s cost of trial.
The presence of litigation costs results in underdeterrence under both strict
liability and negligence rules (Hylton, 1990a).  Strict liability underdeters for two
reasons.  First, victims whose damages are less than the cost of filing suit (i.e., those for
whom v<cv) do not file, so injurers ignore those damages, and second, injurers do not
account for the litigation costs of those victims who do file suit.
For simplicity, we will focus on strict liability in the text and deal with the
negligence case in the appendix.  We will first derive the optimally deterring (or full
internalization) multiplier, and then the socially optimal multiplier.
A. Optimally Deterring Multiplier
Let md be the optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability. Thus, an
accident victim will file suit if mdv ≥ cv, or if
v ≥ cv /md. (2)
It follows that, in the event of an accident, the probability of a suit is 1-H(cv /md).  The
injurer’s expected cost of taking care is thus
∫∞ ++
dv mc
id vdHcvmqx
/
)()(  (3)
while his expected cost of not taking care is
∫∞ +
dv mc
id vdHcvmp
/
)()( . (4)
The injurer will take care if (3) is less than (4), or if
∫∞ +−<
dv mc
id vdHcvmqpx
/
)()()( . (5)
Now consider the social condition for care.  If the injurer takes care, the expected
social costs are
)})](/(1[)({ vidv ccmcHvEqx +−++ . (6)
The expected social costs if the injurer does not take care are
8)})](/(1[)({ vidv ccmcHvEp +−+ . (7)
Care is socially desirable if (6) is less than (7), or if
)})](/(1[)(){( vidv ccmcHvEqpx +−+−< . (8)
Comparison of (5) and (8) shows that when md = 1, strict liability underdeters for the
reasons noted above.
Optimal deterrence is achieved by setting md such that the right-hand sides of (5)
and (8) are equal.  After some manipulation, we obtain the following equation for md:
∫∞ =−
dv mc d
v
d vEvdHm
cvm
/
)()()( . (9)
Call the left-hand side of this equation F(md).  Note that F(0)=0 and
∫∞ >=′
dv mc
vvdHF
/
0)( . (10)
The determination of the optimal value of the multiplier, denoted md*, is shown
graphically in Figure 1.
F(md)
        E(v)
 md* md
Figure 1.
9Note that, since
∫∞ <−=
vc
v vEvdHcvF )()()()1( , (11)
it follows that that md*>1 for cv>0.  Further,
0)]/(1[ <−−=∂
∂
dv
v
mcH
c
F , (12)
which implies that, as expected, md* is increasing in cv.
To gain an intuitive sense of the function of the optimally deterring multiplier,
note that (9) can also be expressed as:
∫∞
−+=
dv mc
vdv
d
vvdH
cmcHvEm
/
)(
)]/(1[)( (13)
Of course, this is not a reduced form since the right-hand side is a function of md.
However, it is clear, as was the case with (9), that the optimal multiplier md*  > 1.9  This is
due to two factors: (1) the fact that injurers ignore victims’ litigation costs (captured by
the second term in the numerator), and (2) the fact that not all victims file suit (captured
by the fact that the denominator is less than E(v)).  The optimal deterrence multiplier is
equal to the ratio of the total loss suffered by victims to the portion of the injury loss
compensated through litigation.  Since litigating victims will be compensated for their
losses, the denominator cancels when multiplied by the average compensatory award, and
the numerator guarantees full internalization of the social loss.
B. Socially Optimal Multiplier
Whereas the optimally deterring multiplier takes litigation as given and aims to
internalize all of the external costs generated by the injurer’s failure to take care, the
socially optimal multiplier does not take litigation as given.  The socially optimal
multiplier minimizes the sum of injury costs, injury avoidance costs, and litigation costs.
If the cost of litigation exceeds its deterrence benefits, the social cost minimization
approach leads to a prohibition of litigation.
                                                
9 Moreover, one can show that there is a unique optimal multiplier, based on (13).  To see this, let Z(md)
represent the right hand side of (13).  The sign of Z’(md) is equal to the sign of {md - Z(md)}.  Thus, if md <
Z(md), Z(md) is decreasing.  This gives a unique fixed point md*.  We will take advantage of this property in
our discussion of empirical implications.
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Based on the informal discussion of Part II, it is straightforward to state the verbal
formula for the socially optimal multiplier.  The socially optimal multiplier equates the
marginal social benefit from deterrence with the marginal cost of litigation.
To derive the socially optimal multiplier, we will start with the objective function.
The objective can be expressed as the minimization of the sum of injuries, injury
avoidance costs, and litigation costs.  Alternatively, we can express the objective as the
maximization of the net social benefit from deterrence, which is the difference between
the deterrence benefit and the total litigation cost, where the deterrence benefit is equal to
avoided harms net of the cost of care.  To remain consistent with the discussion of Part II,
we will use the latter expression of the objective.
Assume x, the cost of care, varies across individuals according to the probability
distribution G(x).  The net social benefit from litigation can be expressed as
G(xi)[(p-q)E(v) – E(x|x<xi)] – [G(xi)q+(1-G(xi))p](1-H(cv /ms))(cv+ci) (14)
where xi is the level of precaution cost at which the injurer is indifferent between taking
care and not taking care.  On the basis of the preceding discussion, xi is equal to the right
hand side of (5) (with a multiplier of ms).  The first expression in (14) is the deterrence
benefit from litigation and the second expression is the expected cost of litigation.
The socially optimal multiplier sets the marginal deterrence benefit equal to the
marginal cost of litigation.  Although there is no simple closed-form solution for the
socially optimal multiplier, one can show that the socially optimal multiplier satisfies
Gm(xi)[E(v) + (1-H(cv /ms))cv – (1-H(cv /ms))msE(v|v>cv /ms)] (15)
= -Hm(cv /ms)[G(xi)q+(1-G(xi))p](cv+ci)
where the subscript m denotes the derivative with respect to that variable.  The left hand
side is the change in the probability an injurer takes care (as the multiplier increases)
multiplied by the difference between the externalized loss for each injury and the
internalized portion of that loss.  As long as this expression is positive, the deterrence
benefit from an additional lawsuit is positive.  The right hand side, which is positive, is
the change in the probability of a lawsuit multiplied by the expected cost of litigation.
The social optimality condition suggests that the multiplier level is not increased
to the point that the social gains from deterrence are exhausted.  Indeed, the following
proposition is implied.
Proposition: In a costly legal system, the socially optimal multiplier is less than
the optimally deterring multiplier.  In other words, the socially optimal level of the
multiplier will not internalize all of the social costs of the injurer’s conduct. This implies
that first-best deterrence is never optimal under a multiplier regime.
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This follows from observing closely the left hand side of the optimality condition.
Exhausting deterrence gains would require setting the left hand side equal to zero, which
results in the multiplier expression in (13); that is, the optimally deterring multiplier.
Since (15) implies that the left hand side should be positive, ms must be less than the
expression in (13), all else equal.  It follows, then, that the socially optimal multiplier is
less than the optimally deterring multiplier.
This result differs from the case of an additive adjustment to damages – that is,
where the damage award is increased by the addition of some fixed amount.  In that case,
the condition that determines the socially optimal level of liability – equating the
marginal deterrence benefit of additional liability to the marginal litigation cost – happens
to be satisfied when the additive adjustment is equal to the victim’s cost of litigation
(Hylton, 2002).  The reason for this is that all victims sue when the damage award is
equal to the victim’s loss plus the victim’s cost of litigation.  Since all victims sue, all
social costs are internalized and the marginal deterrence benefit is driven to zero.  In
addition, the marginal litigation cost is driven to zero – because when every victim sues,
increasing liability will not increase the probability of an additional lawsuit.
The full internalization or first-best deterrence outcome will never be socially
optimal in the multiplier context.  The reason is that one never reaches the point at which
every victim has an incentive to file suit.  For example, if the cost of litigation is $100
and the multiplier is set at 100, victims who suffer a loss of less than one dollar will not
have an incentive to bring suit under the multiplier regime.  Increasing the multiplier,
therefore, always encourages additional litigation.  Since the marginal litigation effect of
increasing the multiplier is always positive, the socially optimal multiplier will never be
set at a level that exhausts the social benefits from deterrence.
C. Model Simulation
The equations derived in the previous part of this paper do not yield simple
closed-form solutions for the optimal multiplier expressions.  We therefore ran
simulations of the model in order to see how the optimal deterrence and socially optimal
multipliers behave as the ratio of damages to litigation costs changes.  We assumed that
the distribution of precaution costs, G(x), and the distribution of losses, H(v), were both
exponential probability functions.  The exponential parameter for H, λh , was assumed to
be one, and the exponential parameter for G, λg , was assumed to be 1 for the first
simulation and 4 for the second.  Since the exponential parameter is equal to the
reciprocal of the mean of the distribution, this is equivalent to assuming that the average
injury loss is $1.  For precaution costs, we assumed an average of $1 in the first
simulation and $0.25 for the second.  In addition, we assumed that the probability of loss
when the injurer does not take care is .80, and the probability of loss when the injurer
does take care is .20.  Under these assumptions, the average avoided loss due to
caretaking is (.8 - .2)(1) = .6.
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The simulation results appear in Figure 2 below.  The horizontal axis shows the
levels at which the cost of litigation was set.  For example, 2 on the horizontal axis means
that cv = ci = $2.  Since the average injury loss is $1, one can interpret the points on the
horizontal axis as the ratio of the cost of suit to the average injury loss.
Figure 2 shows that the optimal deterrence multiplier starts at a value slightly
greater than one (for cv > 0) and increases with a slope of roughly 1.6 as the ratio of the
litigation cost to the average injury loss increases.  In contrast, the socially optimal
multipliers rise initially and then fall as the cost of litigation increases.  This is an
intuitive result, given that the difference between the marginal deterrence benefit and the
marginal litigation cost falls as the cost of litigation increases.
Figure 2 also shows that as precaution becomes more productive (because the
difference between the average injury loss and average precaution cost increases), the
socially optimal multiplier increases.  This is also intuitive, because as precaution
becomes more productive, the potential social gain from liability increases.
Although the socially optimal multiplier values shown in Figure 2 do not rise
much above 2, we obtained higher values by running the simulation with smaller values
for the average cost of precaution (e.g., λg = 8).  Still, in all of the simulations we
observed the same pattern as shown in Figure 2 – initially a rise in the socially optimal
multiplier followed by a decline.
13
Figure 2.
IV. Extensions
A. Strict Liability versus Negligence Multipliers
To this point we have dealt with strict liability.  The results can be extended to the
negligence rule, which (under the Hand rule) holds the injurer liable only if the injurer
failed to take care and injurer’s cost of precaution is less than the avoidable expected
harm (i.e., x < (p-q)E(v)).10  The negligence case is interesting because one can argue that
most legal standards rely on principles of “reasonableness” that are captured in the
negligence test.  Most legal tests in tort law apply reasonableness formulations that
require balancing costs and benefits of the injurer’s conduct.  Similarly, antitrust applies a
“rule of reason,” adapted from the common law, which involves a balancing of costs and
benefits of potentially anticompetitive conduct.
We can show that the optimally deterring multiplier under negligence is greater
than the optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability.  The explanation requires
several steps (see the Appendix for a formal derivation).  First, note that you need to
induce over-compliance with the negligence standard in order to guarantee first-best or
optimal deterrence in the presence of costly litigation.  This is true because the Hand rule
does not account for litigation costs.  First-best deterrence, given costly litigation,
                                                
10 United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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requires injurers to take care whenever the cost of care is less than the sum of the
avoidable expected harm and the expected cost of litigation.  This level is care is greater
than that required by the negligence standard.
Second, once the multiplier is set at a level that induces over-compliance with the
negligence standard, the only actors who will be forced to pay damages are those who
have been held liable erroneously by the court.  Why?  All actors for whom the cost of
taking care is less than the avoidable harms will take care in this regime, and therefore
will not be held liable under the negligence standard.  The only actors who can be held
liable are those who did not take care.  Since, by assumption, we are considering the
over-compliance outcome, these actors are within the group for whom the cost of care
exceeds the avoidable harms.  For simplicity, let us call them “actually non-negligent
actors.”  Actually non-negligent actors will be held liable (deemed negligent) under the
negligence standard only when the court errs.
Third, since the actually non-negligent are the marginal actors in this regime, the
multiplier must be set to induce first-best care on their part.  This can be accomplished by
making them pay, in expectation, the same amount as would the marginal actor under
strict liability.  But they will be held liable only in the instances in which the court
commits a “false conviction” (type-2 error).  In order to bring about first-best deterrence
within this group of actors, then, the optimally deterring negligence multiplier should be
set equal to the strict liability multiplier divided by the probability of a false conviction.
This appears to be a harsh remedy.  Actors who comply with the law are
effectively punished because of the peculiar effect of the negligence standard.  It provides
the right incentives to the subgroup of actors who might be held liable under it, and
virtually exempts the remaining actors from liability.  In order to provide the right
incentives to the remaining actors, the penalty must be set at an extremely high level.
Moreover, as courts become more accurate, the multiplier must increase as well.  For
example, if courts are so accurate that the probability of a false conviction is only two
percent, then the optimally deterring multiplier under negligence is fifty times the
optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability.
The remedy may not be as harsh as first appears, though.  Grady (1994) argues
that for negligence cases involving non-durable precaution, the probability of a false
conviction is quite high.  The reason is that courts are incapable, in the non-durable
precaution context, of determining whether the defendant’s precaution was efficient in
the typical case.11  If, as Grady suggests, negligence operates in a manner similar to strict
liability in areas involving non-durable precaution, then the optimal deterrence multiplier
under negligence will be roughly the same as that under strict liability.
As for the socially optimal multiplier under negligence, the lesson is largely the
same as that under strict liability.  The same principle that determines the socially optimal
                                                
11 If a driver who should look at the road four times every minute looks only twice during one minute, and
causes an accident, it would be impossible for a court to determine whether the driver’s overall level of care
was efficient.
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multiplier under strict liability determines the socially optimal multiplier under
negligence, which is to set the multiplier at a level that equates the marginal benefit from
deterrence to the marginal cost of litigation (see equation 15).  Although we did not run
simulations of the socially optimal negligence multiplier, we see no reason to believe that
they would differ, in some general and important sense, from the results for the strict
liability multiplier.12  On one hand, the marginal deterrence benefit from increasing the
multiplier is diminished in the negligence case because as the multiplier increases,
compliance with the negligence standard increases, reducing the likelihood of a plaintiff
victory, and dampening the incentive to file a claim.  For the same reason the marginal
cost of litigation should be diminished in the negligence case because the effect of an
increase in the multiplier is partially offset by the reduction in the probability of a
plaintiff victory.  Since both the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions shift down,
as one switches from strict liability to negligence, it is difficult to predict any clear
change in the level of the socially optimal multiplier.
B. Compliance versus Optimal Deterrence
Once we start to think about optimal multipliers in the negligence context, one
question we immediately confront is whether we should shift our focus from optimal care
to compliance with the law.  In real courts, people are concerned about whether the actor
complied with the legal standard, not whether his care was socially optimal.  The
negligence standard requires the actor to take care if his precaution cost is less than the
foreseeable incremental losses.  For simplicity, we will refer to compliance with the
negligence standard as “reasonable” care.  If actors exercise reasonable care, then they
are in compliance with the negligence standard.
It is easy to determine the damages multiplier that guarantees reasonable care
under strict liability.  Actors will exercise reasonable care under strict liability if the
expected litigation cost of the injurer equals the expected losses of victims who fail to
bring suit.  If the expected litigation cost of the injurer equals the expected losses of non-
suing victims, then lawsuits effectively internalize the direct losses suffered by victims,
which induces reasonable care on the part of injurers.  In this case, the multiplier that
guarantees reasonable care under strict liability is equal to one.  If the expected litigation
cost of the injurer is less than the expected loss of non-suing victims then the multiplier
that guarantees reasonable care under strict liability will be greater than one, and
conversely.  If mc represents the multiplier that guarantees reasonable care, then under
strict liability,13
)|()]/(1[
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cmcHvEm >−
−−= . (16)
                                                
12 Shavell (1982b) observed that the divergence between the private and social incentive to sue under
negligence is similar to that under strict liability.
13 This equation is obtained by equating the right hand side of (5) with (p-q)E(v) and solving for m.
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This equation suggests that the reasonable care multiplier under strict liability can be
interpreted as the ratio of “total losses not internalized by the injurer’s own litigation
costs” to “loss internalized through lawsuits.”  To simplify, we will refer to this ratio
below as the “defendant’s cost internalization ratio.”
Now, consider the negligence rule.  As Craswell (2000) suggests, it is not clear
that we need to multiply damages under the negligence rule in order to guarantee
compliance with the negligence standard.  The reason is that the negligence rule already
has a sort of built-in multiplier.  Whereas the incremental harm risk connected to the
injurer’s conduct is p-q, the incremental liability risk under negligence, in the absence of
judicial error, is p.  Since, under negligence, the incremental liability risk is usually
greater than the incremental harm risk, the negligence standard operates as if it multiplied
damages in each case.  This suggests that the multiplier necessary for reasonable care
may be less than one under the negligence rule.
Of course, in the negligence setting, one has to make sure that the multiplier is at
least at the level that induces care on the part of those for whom the cost of care is less
than avoidable losses (x < (p-q)E(v)).  At the same time, the multiplier must be less than
the level that induces care on the part of those for whom the cost of care exceeds
avoidable losses (x > (p-q)E(v)).  In other words, we are interested in lower and upper
bounds on a multiplier that would guarantee reasonable care under the negligence
standard.
If we let w = the probability the injurer will be found negligent, θ1 = the
probability of a false finding of non-negligence (or type-1 error), and θ2 = the probability
of a false finding of negligence (or type-2 error), then the lower bound on the multiplier
that guarantees reasonable care under negligence is determined by14
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The last term in (17) is the ratio of the incremental harm risk to the incremental liability
risk, which is likely to be less than one.  This suggests that if the injurer’s litigation cost
internalizes victim losses to the same degree as it does under strict liability, then the
minimum multiplier necessary to guarantee reasonable care under the negligence
standard will be less than the reasonable care multiplier under strict liability.  The
reasonable care multiplier under negligence can be interpreted as the product of the
defendant’s cost internalization ratio and the ratio of incremental harm to incremental
liability risk.
V. Empirical Application
Can we determine empirically whether damages should be multiplied, and if so,
by how much?  In 1986, the RAND Corporation’s Institute for Civil Justice published a
                                                
14 This equation is obtained by equating the right hand side of (A3) with (p-q)E(v) and solving for m.
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monograph titled “Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation,” which includes data
that could be used, in conjunction with this analysis, to get some sense of how the tort
system functions as a mechanism for internalizing the losses caused by injurers.
A. Overall Tort System
Table 1 shows RAND’s assessment of the costs and compensation levels for the
tort system overall.  The total compensation estimates shown include compensation for
judgments in lawsuits and settlements of lawsuits.
Table 1
COMPENSATION PAID IN COMPARISON WITH TOTAL COSTS OF
TORT LITIGATION TERMINATED IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION IN 1985
(In $ billion)
Type of Expenditure Plaintiffs Defendants Courts Total
Total compensation 20.7-25.1 20.7-25.1 NA NA
Total costs of litigation 7.0-8.7 8.0-10.0 0.5 15.5-19.2
Net compensation 13.7-16.4 NA NA 13.7-16.4
Total expenditure NA 28.7-35.1 0.5 29.2-35.6
     Source: 1986 RAND study, Table S.3, at ix.
The figures in Table 1 can be used as aggregate estimates for some of the terms
that appear in the various multiplier expressions derived in this paper.  For example, the
defendant’s litigation costs can be taken as an aggregate estimate of [1-H(cv)]ci , and the
amount of compensation paid can be taken as an estimate of the amount of the total direct
injury internalized through lawsuits, [1-H(cv)]E(v| v > cv).15
The 1986 RAND study does not provide an estimate of the total direct loss to tort
victims.  However, in 1991 RAND published a report titled “Compensation for
Accidental Injuries in the United States.”  The 1991 RAND study estimates the total
monetary cost of nonfatal accidents to be $175.9 billion.  The $175.9 billion figure is the
sum of $97.9 billion in “medical bills and other expenses directly related the accident,”
and $78 billion in lost earnings due to the accident.16  The 1991 RAND study does not
provide a specific year for this figure, but most of the data on which this estimates was
based was collected in the late 1980s (1987 – 89).17  The $175.9 billion figure is an
                                                
15 For simplicity, we use the strict liability results derived earlier in this paper.  This seems appropriate as
an aggregate or system-wide multiplier.  The negligence multiplier, derived in the appendix, requires more
information, and would seem to be appropriate in the case in which the negligence rule operates in all
disputes and the probability of a false conviction is low.
16 1991 RAND study at 103.
17 See Appendix B of 1991 Rand Study, page 179.
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underestimate of the total monetary cost because it excludes costs for fatal accidental
injuries.18
We can use the multiplier expressions derived earlier in this paper to say whether
the existing multiplier of one is too large or too small under some of the criteria
developed.  Consider, first, the optimal deterrence criterion.  Recall that equation (13),
which provides an intuitive expression for the optimal deterrence multiplier, shows that
the optimal deterrence multiplier is equal to the ratio of the total loss (direct harm plus
victim litigation costs) to the internalized (through lawsuits) portion of that loss.  To be
precise, if we let Z(md) represent the ratio of the total loss to the internalized loss, then the
optimal deterrence multiplier, md*, satisfies Z(md*) = md*.  Moreover, given the properties
of (13), if we choose some arbitrary mdo such that mdo < Z(mdo), we know that mdo is less
than the optimal deterrence multiplier.19
It follows, then, that if a multiplier of one were appropriate on optimal deterrence
grounds, then the ratio of the total loss to the internalized loss should be equal to one.  In
fact, given the existing multiplier of one, the ratio of the total loss to the internalized loss
is
9.7
23$
8$9.175$ =+ .
The existing multiplier of one is apparently too low from an optimal deterrence
perspective.  Assuming the properties of equation (13) apply, a multiplier of 7.9 would be
too large for optimal deterrence purposes.20  If we move the multiplier up from one, the
ratio of the total victim loss to the internalized victim loss should fall.  The optimal
deterrence multiplier is therefore between 1 and 7.9.  Taking the mid-point as the proxy,
the optimal deterrence multiplier for the whole tort system appears to be roughly 4.5.  In
other words, this analysis suggests that if damage awards were multiplied by 4.5, injurers
would be forced to bear the full social losses due to their conduct.
The multiplier necessary to guarantee reasonable care, specified in (16), is equal
to the ratio of portion of the victim’s direct loss that is not effectively internalized by the
injurer’s defense costs to the internalized portion of the victim’s direct loss.  We referred
to this earlier as the “defendant’s cost internalization ratio.”  The numerator of this ratio
                                                
18 One way to correct this underestimate is to work backward from the total compensation data.  The 1986
RAND study puts total tort compensation at roughly $23 billion.  The 1991 RAND study puts total tort
compensation at $15.7 billion, the lower figure reflecting the exclusion of wrongful death, property damage
only claims, and most occupational illness and toxic exposure claims.  See RAND (1991) at 198.  If we
assume one third of the difference is captured by the wrongful death claims, and that all accidental deaths
are compensated through lawsuits, then the upward adjustment for fatal accidental injuries is roughly $2.6
billion.  This would bring the estimate of the total direct harm to $178.5 billion.  Since the adjustment is not
substantial, we will use the 1991 RAND estimate in the text.
19 This is because the sign of the slope of Z(m) is the same as the sign of {m – Z(m)}, see supra note 9..
20 Again, recall the argument of note 9, supra.  Plugging in the data, when m =1, Z(m) = 7.9.  Since, by the
argument of note 9, Z(m) is decreasing, the optimal deterrence multiplier, which requires md = Z(md), must
be less than 7.9.
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is the total direct loss less injurers’ litigation costs.  Using $175.9 billion as the estimate
of the total direct harm and the figures from Table 1, the defendant’s cost internalization
ratio is
3.7
23$
9$9.175$ =− .
This suggests, again using the properties of equation (13), that the existing multiplier of
one is too low to guarantee reasonable care.  Taking the midpoint between one and 7.3 as
the estimate, the reasonable care multiplier suggested by this is roughly 4.  Defense costs
are too low to effectively internalize the direct harms of tort victims who fail to bring
claims.
Now, even though the total direct harm figure does not include fatal injuries, one
might argue that it is biased upward because it includes losses that are covered by
liability insurance.  We have in mind: (1) workers compensation payments, (2) employer
disability, and (3) instances in which the liability insurer compensates the victim in the
absence of a lawsuit.  In these cases, the liability insurance premiums may effectively
internalize the direct harms to injurers, and we would not see this internalization by
simply looking at compensation through lawsuits.
The 1991 RAND study reports that roughly $35 billion was transferred (on an
annual basis) through worker’s compensation and employer disability programs.  We
have no figures for the amount transferred through settlements by insurers in the absence
of the filing of a claim.  Reflecting the prevalence of no-fault, some 63 percent of the
total compensation for auto torts reflects payments made in the absence of the filing of a
lawsuit.21  In contrast, in medical malpractice, only 10 percent of the total compensation
from liability insurance reflects claims paid without the filing of a lawsuit.22  Let us
assume that 30 percent of the total compensation paid in liability insurance occurs
without the filing of a lawsuit.  This would give us roughly $10 billion in payments made
on liability claims without the filing of a lawsuit.  Summing these figures we arrive at
$45 billion as the amount paid out in quick settlements.
If we treat quick settlements as equivalent to lawsuits, which seems appropriate,
then the estimate of total compensation paid through lawsuits, [1-H(cv)]E(v| v > cv),
should be adjusted upward to $68 billion.23  Using this figure, the adjusted optimal
deterrence multiplier for the total tort system is found by examining the ratio of the total
loss to the internalized loss:
7.2
68$
8$9.175$ =+ .
                                                
21 See infra, at 20 (estimating “quick settlements” for auto torts at $15.4 billion and total compensation for
auto torts at $24.4 billion, yielding a ratio of 63 percent).
22 See infra, at 21.
23 This is the sum of the $45 billion estimate for “quick settlements” and $23 billion estimate for total
compensation paid through lawsuits.
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Using the same reasoning as in the previous cases, this suggests that the optimal
deterrence multiplier for the total tort system is roughly 2.  The reasonable care multiplier
is found by examining the defendant’s cost internalization ratio:
4.2
68$
9$9.175$ =− ,
which suggests that the reasonable care multiplier is roughly 1.5.
We should note that an alternative set of figures could be used to get us close to
our adjusted multiplier estimates.  The 1986 RAND study reports that a study by
Tillinghast says that $68 billion was spent on the U.S. tort system in 1984.  The RAND
study notes that the $68 billion figure is higher than their high-end estimate of $35.6
billion because it includes the cost of insurance premiums that “cover claims, lawsuits,
and the operation of the insurance system.”
To reach a figure that approximates total liability payments from insurers, deduct
defense costs from Table 1, which are presumably included in the $68 billion.  Using $9
billion for defense costs, this leaves us $59 billion.  If we take off eight percent for
administrative costs and profit, the figure comes down to $54 billion.  This figure
presumably reflects claims paid for by insurers, including those that did and those that
did not enter the tort system.  Since $23 billion was paid to compensate litigating tort
victims, the remaining $31 billion can be taken as an estimate of liability payments made
in the absence of the filing of a lawsuit.  This is less than our estimate of $45 billion.
However, taking $54 billion as the total internalized loss would yield an optimal
deterrence multiplier estimate roughly the same as the adjusted estimate of two.
B. Auto Torts
The RAND studies allow us to take the same back-of-the-envelope approach to
auto tort litigation.  The aggregate litigation cost for plaintiffs in auto torts is put at $2.5
billion in the 1986 RAND study.  The aggregate litigation cost for auto tort defendants is
put at roughly $2 billion.  The aggregate amount paid out in compensation for lawsuits
was $9 billion in 1985.  This includes settlements and trial verdicts.  The aggregate
amount paid out in compensation (with or without lawsuits) was $24.4 billion.
We are not primarily interested in the amount paid out as compensation to
claimants, but in finding an estimate of the total direct loss.  The 1991 RAND study
reports the total direct monetary cost of motor vehicle accidents to be $37 billion.  Again,
this is an underestimate because it excludes fatal accidents.
How much of the $24.4 billion paid was internalized through lawsuits?
Obviously, $9 billion was internalized.  However, of the difference, $15.4 billion, some
portion represents liability claims that were paid without the filing of a lawsuit.  Since a
rational insurer would not voluntarily pay unless the claim represented a credible lawsuit,
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we should treat the part of $15.4 billion consisting of third-party liability claims paid
without a lawsuit as early (or quick) settlements.  To determine this portion we used the
proportion of states that are effectively “fault” regimes.
As of 1989, 16 states were no-fault in the sense that they imposed thresholds that
claims had to exceed before allowing access to the courts.  An additional 9 states were
“add-on” states, in the sense that the claimant could choose to forgo the no-fault plan and
file a lawsuit instead.  If we treat the 9 “add-on” states as half-no-fault, then the effective
percentage of no-fault states is 42 percent.  If 42 percent of states can be characterized as
“no-fault,” we will assume that 58 percent of the $15.4 billion, $8.9 billion, consists of
early settlements on third-party liability claims.  The remaining $6.5 billion is assumed to
represent first-party claims.  Adding $8.9 billion to the compensation paid in lawsuits
changes the amount internalized through liability suits from $9 billion to $17.9 billion.
Recall that the optimal deterrence multiplier is equal to the ratio of the total victim
costs (direct injury loss plus litigation costs) to the internalized portion of that loss
(compensation paid).  Evaluated at the existing multiplier, the ratio of the total loss to the
internalized loss is
2.2
9.17$
5.2$37$ =+ .
This suggests, under the reasoning of the previous discussion, that the optimal deterrence
multiplier for auto torts is roughly 1.6 (i.e., the midpoint between 1 and 2.2).
The reasonable care multiplier is suggested by examining the ratio
9.1
9.17$
2$37$ =− .
Using the midpoint between one and 1.9 as the estimate, this suggests a reasonable care
multiplier of 1.4.
C. Medical Malpractice
The 1986 RAND study puts the aggregate litigation cost for medical malpractice
defendants in 1985 at $.6 billion.  The aggregate litigation cost for plaintiffs is roughly
the same.  The total compensation paid in lawsuits for malpractice in 1985 is $1.69
billion.  The total amount paid to malpractice claimants (summing amount paid in
lawsuits and amount paid without a lawsuit) is $1.88 billion.
One preliminary issue is how one should interpret the difference between the total
amount paid to claimants, $1.88 billion, and the total amount paid in lawsuits, $1.69
billion.  The difference, $.19 billion, represents medical malpractice claims that were paid
without a lawsuit.  In the malpractice context, these claims are likely to consist of highly
credible potential lawsuits.  Profit-maximizing insurers would not have an incentive to
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voluntarily pay out on claims that could not form the basis of a credible lawsuit.  We
should therefore view the $.19 billion paid by insurers without the filing of a lawsuit as
early settlements. Under this view, the total $1.88 billion should be treated as
compensation paid in lawsuits.
Since neither the 1986 RAND study nor the 1991 RAND study provide an
estimate of the total direct loss to medical malpractice victims, we had to reinterpret some
of the data provided in the 1986 study to arrive at such an estimate.  The study reports
“losses incurred” for 1985 as roughly $3.5 billion.  This amount is equal to the sum of
compensation paid out and the net change in reserves set aside for future claims.
We decided to treat losses incurred as a proxy for the direct losses to victims.
After deducting 35 percent of the differential between “compensation paid” and “losses
incurred” to estimate money set aside to cover litigation costs, we arrived at an estimate
of direct loss of $2.9 billion.  Although this may seem large amount in comparison to
“compensation paid,” the literature on medical malpractice litigation suggests that the
majority of potentially valid malpractice claims never materialize as lawsuits (Weiler, et
al (1993).  Insurers have records documenting the existence of these potential claims and
set aside reserves to meet them, though probably not under the assumption that they will
pay 100 percent of these claims.
Using $2.9 billion as our estimate of the total direct loss, the optimal deterrence
multiplier is suggested by the ratio of the total loss to the total internalized loss
86.1
88.1$
6$.9.2$ =+ .
Assuming, as in the previous cases, that the relationship between the multiplier and the
ratio of the total to the internalized loss has properties that allow us to move step-by-step
toward the solution for the optimal deterrence multiplier, the optimal deterrence
multiplier for medical malpractice appears to be roughly 1.4.  We will interpret this as an
indication that multiplying damages is unnecessary for optimal deterrence purposes in
medical malpractice.
The reasonable care multiplier is found by examining the ratio of the direct harm
net of the defendant’s litigation cost to the total internalized loss:
2.1
88.1$
6$.9.2$ =− .
This ratio suggests, if we take the mid-point between 1 and 1.2 as the solution, that the
reasonable care multiplier is roughly equal to one.  There appears to be no clear case for
multiplying damages in order to guarantee reasonable care in the medical malpractice
context.  The reason is that defense costs effectively internalize most of the direct
monetary harm suffered by victims who fail to bring legal claims.
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These results are biased upward to the extent they ignore the fact that insurance
premiums partially internalize the losses of victims who do not bring suit.  However, the
results are biased downward to the extent they fail to incorporate information on the
claimants whose losses are too small to form the basis of credible lawsuit.  Presumably
insurers discount these claims and do not incorporate them as costs that must be covered
by insurance premiums.  We are unable to say which bias dominates.
VI. Summary and Implications
The “multiplier principle” (“1/p approach”), that damages should be multiplied by
the reciprocal of the probability of punishment, has been accepted as one of the basic
lessons of the law and economics literature.  The foregoing discussion explores the
principle in the private damages setting, instead of the more common framework of
analysis in which a public enforcement agency has to choose the optimal penalty.  Our
treatment points to three types of multiplier that courts could apply in the torts setting: an
optimal deterrence multiplier that brings about first-best deterrence, a socially optimal
multiplier that minimizes overall social costs, and a reasonable care multiplier that
guarantees compliance with the negligence standard.
In theory the optimal deterrence multiplier could assume any positive value
greater than one, depending on the size of litigation costs.  Moreover, the optimal
deterrence multiplier increases as litigation costs rise relative to the average direct harm.
If the ratio of litigation costs to the average direct damage were sufficiently high, the
optimal deterrence approach could be used to justify multipliers well in excess of the
doubling or trebling rules observed in state and federal statutes.
In contrast, the socially optimal multiplier is always less than the optimal
deterrence multiplier and falls toward zero as the ratio of litigation costs to the direct
harm increases.  Our simulation results suggest that the socially optimal multipliers will
often be below the doubling or trebling levels, and sometimes less than one.
Our efforts to get rough empirical estimates of the optimal deterrence multipliers
suggest comparatively modest levels in relation to the potentially large multiplier
suggested by the theoretical analysis.  The optimal deterrence multiplier for the whole
tort system and for auto torts appears to be roughly two.  Given that roughly half of all
tort filings involve auto accidents, one should not be surprised to find that the optimal
deterrence multipliers for the whole system and for auto torts are roughly equal.  In
contrast, the medical malpractice data suggest no need to multiply awards in order to
guarantee optimal deterrence.
The optimal deterrence multipliers suggested by the empirical application are
lower than one would expect on the basis of a simplistic application of the “1/p”
approach.  This intuitive approach would simply divide the harm by the probability of
liability.  Since the probability of liability cannot be greater than the probability that a suit
is filed, the reciprocal of the probability of a lawsuit might be taken, under this approach,
as a lower bound on the appropriate multiplier.  Although the U.S. is known as a litigious
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country, the data show that claims are relatively infrequent events in relation to the base
of injuries that give rise to them.  The 1991 RAND study estimates that roughly one
injury in ten leads to an attempt to collect liability compensation – in other words, a
lawsuit probability of .10.24  The straightforward 1/p approach would suggest a multiplier
of at least 10 for the tort system, which is far too high.
The empirical application gives a new perspective on the role of insurance.  Some
commentators have suggested that insurance should be abolished because it dilutes
incentives to take care.  Others have noted that insurance enhances incentives to take care
by financing the monitoring of care levels and providing signals to potential injurers that
relate the price of insurance to their care levels.  The empirical application in this paper
suggests that a significant degree of internalization occurs directly through insurance or
insurance-like (e.g., workers compensation) contracts, bypassing the courts.  In the
absence of such contracts, many of the injured parties would have to seek compensation
through the tort system.  Since litigation is costly, a substantial share of these claimants
would not have an incentive to bring suit.  Moreover, among the claimants who file suit,
their targets would be limited to large, financially-sound (deep-pocket) entities.  Given
this, the insurance system plays an important role in directly internalizing and channeling
costs to actors who are in the best position to control them.
The central normative question generated by this analysis is whether we should
prefer the optimal deterrence to the socially optimal multiplier.  The question is
equivalent to asking whether we would prefer to live in a world with fewer accidental
injuries but a lower standard of living.  One could justify a preference for the optimal
deterrence multiplier on the ground that people are risk averse, and given their risk
aversion, would prefer as between the two multipliers the one that minimizes the risk of
accidental injury.  The ideal tort system minimizes the sum of primary (injury),
secondary (risk-spreading), and tertiary (administrative and litigation) costs (Calabresi,
1970).  A case could be made that the optimal deterrence multiplier comes closest to this
objective.
However, the Calabresian argument for full internalization has an arbitrary feel to
it.  There is no way to show that people are sufficiently risk averse to justify the choice of
the low-risk, safe regime.  Moreover, in a world in which people are free to insure
themselves against the risk of accidental injury, there is no uncontested case for
compelling adoption of the safe regime.  At a minimum, to justify such a choice,
insurance markets must be so incomplete that the residual secondary costs are large
enough to justify adoption of the low-risk regime.
Another approach to justifying a preference for the optimal deterrence multiplier
is to rely on some version of the Aristotelian corrective justice framework.  The
corrective justice approach is equivalent to assuming an ordering of preferences in which
the righting of wrongs through compensation is given the first priority.  Since one is free
to choose the definition of a wrong under this model,25 one could say that the injurer has
                                                
24 1991 RAND study, at 120-21.
25 Posner (1983) at 73-74.
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committed a wrong when he violates the negligence standard or some more stringent test
based on “causation.”26  As between the socially optimal multiplier and the optimal
deterrence multiplier, it should be clear that the corrective justice approach would choose
the latter.  To be sure, this approach is no less arbitrary than the Calabresian argument.
VII. Conclusion
The notion that damages should be scaled up by dividing by the probability of
punishment is one of the basic lessons from the economic analysis of law.  While the idea
has been developed further in the economic analysis of criminal law, relatively little
effort has been applied to specifying multipliers for deterrence in the civil damages
setting.  This paper sets out to fill this gap in the literature.  The simple “1/p” multiplier
suggested by Bentham turns out to be inapplicable in the civil damages setting.  The
multiplier that brings about first-best deterrence must be chosen by striking a balance
between the supply of lawsuits and the need for internalization of costs.  Moreover, given
the costs of litigation, a multiplier that minimizes overall social costs, as opposed to
achieving first-best deterrence, may need to be set at a level (perhaps less than one) that
effectively bars many claims.
                                                
26 The “causation” standard (strict liability) is urged in Epstein (1973).
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Appendix
In this Appendix we examine the optimal deterrence multiplier under negligence.
We will start with a review of basic results on compliance with the negligence rule.
Injurers face socially inadequate incentives for care under a negligence test based
on the Hand formula (which hold the defendant negligent if he failed to take care when x
< (p-q)E(v)).  As Ordover (1978) showed, when litigation is costly, equilibrium under a
negligence rule must involve some injurers who fail to meet the due standard.  If this
were not the case, victims would never file suit (assuming the Hand test is applied
without error), which would be inconsistent with injurers’ compliance with the due
standard. Thus, in equilibrium, some victims file suit and some injurers are found
negligent.  But since the standard of care set by the Hand test is too low in a world of
costly litigation, injurers face inadequate incentives for care.  If the Hand test is applied
with error, greater compliance with the due standard is possible (indeed, some
overcompliance may occur), but the equilibrium must still involve underdeterrence
(Hylton, 1990b).
In view of these results, we examine the use of damage multipliers to achieve
optimal deterrence when litigation is costly.  Although negligence underdeters both with
and without legal error, we show that use of a multiplier is feasible only when there is
error.  Further, the negligence multiplier, when feasible, will always be larger than the
strict liability multiplier.
Assume, as in Hylton (1990a, 1990b) that the negligence standard is defined by
the Hand test.  In the context of the current model, this means that an injurer will be
found negligent if he failed to take care and the court determines that his cost of care is
less than the expected savings in damages; that is, if x<(p-q)E(v).  Injurers for whom this
condition holds are said to be “potentially negligent.”
As noted above, it will turn out that a multiplier can be used to achieve optimal
deterrence under negligence only if the Hand test is applied with error (we will show this
below).  Therefore, let θ1 be the probability of a type 1 error (the probability that the court
finds a negligent defendant non-negligent), and let θ2 be the probability of a type 2 error
(the probability that the court finds a non-negligent injurer negligent).27  Although the
court makes errors, we assume it is sufficiently accurate that
1-θ1>θ2. (A1)
This says that a negligent injurer is more likely to be found negligent than is a non-
negligent injurer.
                                                
27 We assume, following Png (1987), Polinsky and Shavell (1989), and Hylton (1990b), that both
probabilities are constant.
27
An accident victim will file suit under negligence if wvmN>cv, where w is defined
to be the probability that the injurer will be found negligent, and mN is the negligence
multiplier. Thus, if an accident occurs the probability of a suit is 1-H(cv/wmN).  We
assume that, although victims do not know if a given injurer is negligent (i.e., they do not
observe his care choice), they correctly perceive the probability of a negligent verdict,
including the possibility of legal error.  Thus,
w=s(1-θ1)+(1-s)θ2=θ2+(1-θ1-θ2)s (A2)
where s is the probability that the injurer is truly negligent—i.e., that he is both
potentially negligent and fails to take care.28
A potentially negligent injurer (one for whom x<(p-q)E(v)) will take care if
x+q ∫∞ +
Nv wmc
iN vdHcvm
/
2 )()(θ <p ∫∞ +−
Nv wmc
iN vdHcvm
/
1 )())1(( θ ,
or if
∫∞ −−+−−<
Nv wmc
iNvN cwmcHqpvvdHmqpx
/
21 )]/(1)[()(])1([ θθ ≡A(mN) (A3).
An injurer who is not potentially negligent (one for whom x>(p-q)E(v)) will take care if
x+q ∫ ∫∞ ∞ +<+
Nv Nvwmc wmc
iNiN vdHcvmpvdHcvm
/ /
22 )()()()( θθ
or if
∫∞ +−<
Nv wmc
iN vdHcvmqpx
/
2 )()()( θ ≡B(mN) (A4)
Note from (A3) that the incentive for care by potentially negligent injurers is reduced by
an increase in both types of errors.  In contrast, (A4) shows that incentives for care by
injurers who are not potentially negligent are unaffected by type 1 errors but are actually
enhanced by an increase in type 2 errors.  This is because injurers who are not potentially
negligent can never be found incorrectly non-negligent, but they do face the possibility of
being found incorrectly negligent.  This reduces the benefit of failing to take care.
                                                
28 Since victims correctly perceive the probability of a negligent verdict, they calculate s using Bayes’ rule
(see Hylton, 1990b).  It will turn out, however, that in an efficient equilibrium, s=0.
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As under strict liability, injurers ignore the damages to victims who do not file
suit as well as the litigation costs of those who do.  Thus, the social condition for care
under negligence is given by
)})](/(1[)(){( ivNv ccwmcHvEqpx +−+−< ≡S(mN) (A5)
The objective is to set the negligence multiplier so that all injurers for whom (A5) is
satisfied actually take care. Since the right-hand side of (A5) exceeds (p-q)E(v), it follows
that all potentially negligent injurers, as well as some who are not potentially negligent,
should take care.  This is true because the Hand rule, which determines potential
negligence, ignores litigation costs, which increase the socially desirable level of care.
Thus, in an efficient equilibrium, it must be the case that s=0.  That is, no injurers are
truly negligent according to the Hand rule.  As a result, (A2) implies that w=θ2, which
says that the only findings of negligence by the court are erroneous ones. This is a
consequence of the fact, noted above, that when litigation is costly, a negligence
equilibrium without legal error must underdeter (Ordover, 1978; Hylton, 1990a).
The fact that, in an efficient equilibrium, the marginal care taker must be an
injurer who is not potentially negligent, implies that the relevant equation for deriving the
negligence multiplier is S(mN)=B(mN).29  After setting w=θ2 and rearranging, this
equation can be written
∫∞ =−
2/ 2
2 )()()(
θ θ
θ
Nv mc N
v
N vEvdHm
cvm (A6)
or
F(mNθ2)=E(v) (A6′)
Comparing this equation to equation (9) in the text implies
mS=mNθ2,  or  mN=mS/θ2. (A7)
Since θ2 is between zero and one, mN>mS.  Thus, the negligence multiplier is larger than
the strict liability multiplier, all else equal.
A further implication of (A7) is that
0
22
<−=∂
∂
θθ
NN mm . (A8)
                                                
29 Note that A(mN)>B(mN).  Thus, in an efficient equilibrium, all potentially negligent injurers will take care
as well.
29
Thus, the negligence multiplier decreases as the probability of type 2 error increases.
(See Figure 3.) This reflects the fact that type 2 errors enhance deterrence for injurers
who are not potentially negligent, and therefore move the equilibrium closer to the
optimum.  Equation (A7) also implies that if θ2=1, the optimally deterring negligence and
strict liability multipliers are identical.  In this case, negligence in effect becomes strict
liability because taking care does not act as a shield from liability.
At the other extreme, as 02 →θ , the negligence multiplier becomes infinite. This
reflects the fact that in a world without legal error, no injurers who are not potentially
negligent can be induced to take care because they will never be found negligent by the
court.  Thus, the multiplier cannot be applied to them.  In theory, a negligence multiplier
could still improve deterrence by being set to induce all potentially negligent injurers to
take care (some of whom do not do so in equilibrium), but, as noted above, this would not
be sufficient to achieve optimal compliance, given that the due standard set by the Hand
rule is too low (i.e., a perfect compliance equilibrium is suboptimal).  Moreover, it would
simply restore the problem of non-existence of an equilibrium in which there is perfect
compliance.
mN
mS
         1 θ2
Figure 3.
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